In my last post, I showed how the airline industry has consolidated significantly, with most European and US airlines falling into just three mega-groups that control a significant share of the world’s seats. But the consolidation appears nowhere near over. The airline industry is genuinely hard to forecast. Hub airports, widebody fleets, equity stakes, and airline alliances play out over 10 to 20-year lifespans. The economic forecasts they are built on are inherently uncertain, however. Demand, fuel prices, regulation, geopolitics, industrial issues, climate policy, or air accidents can derail what looked like a sure path for an airline or hub. In these imaginary scenarios, I am exploring hypothetical scenarios that could occur.
1. Asian carriers have been holding out against the type of full consolidation experienced in Europe and North America. Strong national carriers, often with government backing and sizable domestic markets, sustain a more diverse airline landscape across the region.
But the pressure is building. Singapore Airlines merged SilkAir and is keeping Scoot for lower-yield routes that don’t justify the full-service operator. It is building stakes in other carriers. Malaysia Airlines and AirAsia have repeatedly been linked to merger talks. Korean Air and Asiana are merging, reshaping the Korean market almost overnight. This is Asia’s clearest example of European-style consolidation: two real competitors at home shrinking into one, low-cost carriers picking off the edges, while regulators try to patch the gap with remedies.
Four Chinese groups, Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, and Hainan, already control a large share of their domestic market, with dozens of brands under their ownership. Cathay Pacific now has Air China as a major shareholder. India’s aviation market consolidates and fractures in cycles. Air India (now Tata-owned) is now absorbing Vistara and AirAsia India.
Garuda, Thai, and Malaysia could emerge as smaller, state-anchored flag carriers connected to IAG carriers or ANA, Japan Airlines or Singapore Airlines. They would be plugged into the bigger joint ventures but remain officially and technically “national”.
2. Africa has only six significant local airlines across the whole continent of 1.5 billion people: Ethiopian, EgyptAir, Royal Air Maroc, Airlink, South African Airways, and Kenya Airways. Even these six face challenges. SAA is struggling, and Kenya Airways moves from one restructuring plan to the next. Airlink is increasingly acting as a regional feeder for Qatar.
Royal Air Maroc is a good example of how messy this gets outside Europe and North America. On paper, it’s still a proudly independent, state-owned flag carrier with a growing Casablanca hub and new routes to Los Angeles and a string of European cities. In practice, it relies heavily on its roles within oneworld on the one hand and its partnership with Emirates on the other. It isn’t being consumed the way Alitalia or BMI were, but it is not entirely a free agent either. It’s operating more like a regional franchise that keeps the Moroccan flag on the tail while plugging its passengers straight into someone else’s global network.
Ethiopian Airlines is notable as the exception. It is very profitable, expanding, and building its own mini-empire with stakes in airlines across the continent. The rest of Africa has many struggling national carriers; some are financially fragile and reliant on government support. They are often too small to compete internationally but too politically important to be easily shut down. For example: Tunisair, TAAG Angola, RwandAir, Air Algérie. The consolidation here will not look like Europe, as it will be driven by different forces. Ethiopian is best placed to absorb smaller African carriers.
The big carriers (Emirates, Qatar, Turkish), who already dominate the Africa-Europe and Africa-Asia routes, are likely to continue to do so. I believe African governments may eventually accept equity stakes from these players rather than holding on to their consistently loss-making flag carriers, in return for guaranteed service to their nations. In this imagining, the real winners could be the Middle Eastern mega-hubs that already control most of Africa’s long-haul international traffic.
3. Emirates, Independent Outlier as the world’s largest international airline by Available Seat Kilometres (the key metric for long‑haul) and, in recent reporting periods, one of the most profitable major carriers. It operates its own global network, shows no signs of bending to consolidation pressure, and continues to operate outside the global alliances. flydubai runs in tandem with Emirates, providing its own mini low‑cost feeder network. Instead of joining an alliance, Emirates builds a web of bilateral partnerships. It has a deep joint venture with Qantas on the oneworld side, plus codeshares and mileage deals with Royal Air Maroc and other oneworld carriers. On the Star Alliance side, it has codeshares and commercial cooperation with United, Avianca and others, giving it access to Star feed in the US and Latin America without joining Star itself. Emirates maintains close partnerships with airlines from both oneworld and Star Alliance, but always via one‑to‑one contracts, never as a formal alliance member. Emirates proves that scale and a strong hub can still work outside the alliance structure, but it is one of the few remaining examples of this model.
4. Qatar Airways is playing a different game by acquiring strategic stakes in healthy, successful airlines that are already part of the mega‑groups. With 25% of IAG (British Airways’ group), 10% of LATAM, 25% of South Africa’s Airlink, 25% of Virgin Australia, and now 49% of Rwandair. ,Qatar is funnelling passengers into its Doha network from dozens of destinations from these players. One impact: Qatar now carries around 21% of Australia–Europe traffic, far more than Australian flag carrier Qantas. Qatar learned from Etihad’s mistakes. Etihad tried a similar strategy and ultimately failed, buying minority stakes in failing airlines like Air Berlin and Alitalia, hoping to turn them around and feed traffic through Abu Dhabi. Both went bankrupt in 2017, costing Etihad over $800 million. Qatar seems to have realised it does not need to fight the mega‑groups or fix broken airlines. It just needs to own pieces of the winners.
5. Saudi Arabia’s shift into a more competitive and attractive aviation market is a wildcard. In 2023, the country jumped sharply in the global rankings for international tourist spending, with tourism now contributing around 5% of GDP and creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs in recent years. Meanwhile, the aviation sector is being rebuilt around an official target of handling about 330 million passengers annually by 2030.
At the Skytrax World Airline Awards, Saudia has climbed from 82nd globally in 2017 to 17th in 2025 and has been named the “World’s Most Improved Airline” for four consecutive years. Saudia is expected to focus on building Jeddah into its primary hub and to scale down its presence at Riyadh. Five hundred miles away, Riyadh Air is launching on October 26, 2025, with a well‑funded, in my view, credible business plan and the aim of making Riyadh airport a second mega‑hub in the kingdom.
This is not typical airline economics; it is nation‑building, with the state backing large hub airports and rapid capacity growth as part of a national Vision 2030. They are operating outside the usual consolidation pressures because the state is supporting them. Fast‑forward ten years, and anything from a successful “double‑hub” Saudi system to a more awkward partial build‑out is on the table. If Vision 2030 largely succeeds, Saudia grows into the workhorse wings of a busier, more open kingdom while Riyadh Air stitches Riyadh into the same global map as Dubai and Doha. Miss the growth targets, or run into oil, politics, or climate headwinds, and you risk two overlapping carriers chasing not‑quite‑enough traffic, with an eventual tidy‑up merger quietly undoing today’s gamble. Either way, the rest of the Gulf and Indian Ocean rim will have to decide whether to fight it, feed it, or join it.
6. Other Middle East carriers may be living on borrowed time. Royal Jordanian, MEA, and Egyptair are likely to struggle to grow meaningfully against the big Gulf and Turkish hubs. Their governments have limited fiscal room to keep expanding fleets, and their home markets are relatively small compared to the scale of Gulf competition. They could, in theory, be absorbed by one of the mega‑carriers.
Gulf Air was the key Middle East hub carrier before the 1970s. Now it is led by a board trying to turn a loss‑making airline around. Etihad tried to build its own global network and ran into major financial trouble. It has pivoted back to profitability after burning through billions, but will likely keep shrinking.
Oman Air has pulled back to a more focused niche as the company was instructed to be more prudent with its finances. Now it has given up planes, cut routes, and flies 737s on long routes while operating from a massive, underutilised mega‑airport. Oman joined oneworld last year, sponsored by Qatar. Why couldn’t Qatar, in theory, buy a stake and turn them into a feeder? The relationship is already there through long‑standing codeshares since 2020, giving Oman Air passengers access to 60–80+ destinations over Doha. There is currently no confirmed Qatar equity stake in Oman Air; what follows is a hypothetical scenario of how such a deal might work. A Qatar equity stake would lock in another passenger feed, clean up Oman Air’s balance sheet, and let Muscat keep a flag carrier without carrying all the network risk.
7. Turkish Airlines: Wants a European Carrier
Turkish Airlines was taking off at dawn as I ran a charity run on Bangkok’s new third runway. What dawn does Turkish face? They currently straddle Europe and Asia, with a successful hub strategy in Istanbul. They fly to more countries than any other airline and are happy to boast about it, but they clearly want better access to European markets.
Constrained by EU ownership and control rules, they have instead been bidding for stakes in several carriers. They have been linked to bids or interest in Air Europa, LOT, and now TAP. The question is whether regulators will allow it or whether one of the big three European groups will outbid them. If they succeed in acquiring one of the remaining independents, it would give them a foothold in the European consolidation game and potentially create a fourth European power centre. If they keep getting blocked or outbid, Turkish may remain an outlier. It will be large and successful, but somewhat outside the real power structure. While Turkish is profitable and has strong state backing, keeping it independent for now, it is interesting to ask whether, in a very different political or financial climate, a group like Lufthansa could ever be allowed to swoop in on Turkish at all.
8. Alaska Airlines has made some bold moves to go from being a popular regional player to a more fully fledged global airline. After completing their acquisition of Hawaiian Airlines in 2024, they gained not just an island network but a much stronger Pacific presence, including deeper links to Australia. More significantly, they ordered Boeing 787 Dreamliners – their first widebody aircraft – to support a growing network of long‑haul routes from Seattle to Asia and Europe through to 2030.
Fast‑forward a decade, and Alaska is either the West Coast’s neat little global connector or another case study in overreach. If the Hawaiian integration works and the 787s fly full, Alaska becomes a compact oneworld‑anchored network carrier, feeding Asia and Europe off a dense West Coast spine. Hawaiian’s widebodies could end up running something like a dozen long‑haul routes by 2030, while American and oneworld fill in the rest of the global map. If it does not work, the group ends up with an expensive island franchise, a half‑built long‑haul map, and the kind of balance‑sheet problems that turn proud independents into someone else’s acquisition target.
For now, Alaska funnels passengers onto the oneworld network. With foreign ownership capped and US policymakers wary of foreign control of major airlines, Qatar or IAG would be unlikely or unable to invest in or own the Alaska brand outright. If regulators ever allow another round of mergers, the next step would be American finally absorbing its West Coast partner. But for now, that looks distant.
9. I am curious about Icelandair, which has deliberately stayed outside Star Alliance, oneworld, and SkyTeam, stacking bilateral deals instead. It has JetBlue, Alaska, and Southwest as partners in the US. Alaska has announced nonstop Seattle–Reykjavík from 2026 and a significantly expanded bilateral codeshare with Icelandair. Could there be an opportunity for a niche fourth grouping around Alaska–JetBlue–Icelandair on the Atlantic? JetBlue feeding Icelandair from the US East Coast, Alaska feeding from the West Coast, with Icelandair providing the European network? It is a long shot, but it is one of the few genuine alternatives being tested.
10. The Latin American Blocs
In Latin America, consolidation has resulted in a handful of powerful players circling each other, experimenting with cross‑border holdings and tentative mergers. The outlines of larger blocs are there, but the pieces have not fully clicked into place. Chile’s LAN and Brazil’s TAM merged to form LATAM, the region’s largest airline group. Avianca and GOL have come together under the Abra project, a Latin American airline holding company that also includes stakes and plans involving Viva, Wamos and Sky.
Azul, Brazil’s other major network carrier, has faced significant financial challenges in recent years and at various points has floated or been linked to potential combinations with GOL. Had a GOL–Azul deal gone ahead alongside Abra’s expansion, it could have created a carrier with around 70% of Brazil’s domestic market. If that had happened, and the Abra project continued, we could have ended up with something close to two Latin American mega‑groups: an Avianca–GOL/Azul‑centred bloc controlling large parts of Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Chile, and LATAM on the other side holding much of the remaining regional traffic. This picture remains speculative, however, especially now that talks about a possible combination with Azul have been terminated and Brazilian regulators have signalled that approving a dominant single carrier in Brazil would be politically and legally difficult.
11. The Pacific.
Qantas, Air New Zealand, Virgin Australia, and Fiji Airways are the main airlines in the Pacific region. Smaller airlines include Air Tahiti Nui, Aircalin, Air Vanuatu, and Solomon Airlines.
Qantas links Australia to the US and Asia through the oneworld alliance and is working more with partners like Fiji Airways. This role is expected to continue. Qantas and its Jetstar subsidiary will likely operate many Asia-Pacific island routes with narrowbody planes, while focusing on ultra-long-haul Project Sunrise non-stops to London and New York. They will also continue to offer one-stop routes through hubs such as Singapore or Auckland.
Air New Zealand is vital to its home market and is not likely to be sold, but it is too small to operate fully on its own. it manages various partnerships, including those with Qantas, United, Alaska, and JetBlue. The airline will probably continue to protect its domestic and Tasman routes while choosing alliances or bilateral deals that offer the best connections and returns.
Virgin Australia has changed its business model three times, shifting from an ultra-low-cost carrier to a full-service airline, and now to a hybrid model with both business-class and competitive-economy fares. The airline partners with Delta and United for trans-Pacific routes and with Qatar Airways for long-haul flights. As a key second Australian player in the trans-Pacific market, Qatar (25% owner) or Singapore Airlines, or a large US carrier, might seek to fully acquire the airline if Australian regulations permitted it.
Fiji is turning Nadi into a one-stop hub between Australia, New Zealand, and major North American cities. More passengers now use Nadi as a connecting point instead of a final destination. Fiji has passed laws to ensure “substantial ownership and effective control” stays Fijian, mainly to stop Qantas or other foreign owners from running the airline.
Many smaller island states now depend on Fiji Airways for their only or main international connections. Originally, Fiji Airways (then Air Pacific) was co-owned by several Pacific governments. Over time, most of these states established their own national airlines, such as Air Nauru, Polynesian Airways, and Solomon Airlines, but many have faced financial struggles.
12 Low-Cost Carriers – A Different Game
Low-cost carriers like Ryanair, Wizz Air, easyJet, AirAsia, and VietJet now account for a large share of discounted short‑haul seats. They are constantly nipping at the heels of the big carriers even as those giants tighten their grip. AirAsia, for example, is one of the giants in Southeast Asia by seats and passenger volume, while Thai, Malaysia and Garuda are smaller, state‑anchored flag carriers alongside it. While AirAsia has periodically been linked to potential tie‑ups with Malaysia Airlines, such a merger still looks unlikely.
The low‑cost model has proven resilient, but these carriers rarely challenge the mega‑groups on long‑haul or premium routes at scale. They operate in parallel rather than in direct competition, carving out their own segment while the alliances control the profitable business and premium traffic.
The truly independent ULCCs are likely to keep running in parallel rather than being neatly folded into the mega‑groups. Ryanair and Wizz are now giants in their own right, with massive market caps and low costs; buying them would be extremely expensive, politically sensitive and likely to be challenged as anti‑competitive.
For travellers, the question is not whether consolidation will continue, but what kind of consolidated world we end up with 17 mega groups. If most of my speculation broadly plays out, the rough picture looks like this:
a) three big transatlantic and global alliance blocs;
b) an emboldened Turkish Airlines if it secures a meaningful European foothold;
c) two Latin American blocs, LATAM and Abra;
d) Emirates as the archetypal outlier, Qatar as a worldwide network orchestrator, and Saudia plus Riyadh Air, with most other flag carriers in the region folded into, or treated as feeders for, these big groups;
e) the Chinese airline groups, SIA/Scoot and a consolidated Indian system around Air India, all supplemented by smaller state‑backed locals and feeders;
f) and Ethiopian as a pan‑African group
This domination by a few mega‑groups, state‑backed hubs and a handful of outliers could deliver stability and seamless networks, but at the cost of quirks, competition and genuine choice. The balance between those outcomes is unlikely to be decided by airlines alone; it will depend on how strongly our regulators police further consolidation, how far governments are willing to intervene, and whether passengers still care enough to keep asking who really owns the logos on the departure board.
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